Fordham Law Review
Volume 80

Issue 1

Article 7

2011

Don't Blame Me, Blame the Financial Crisis: A Survey of Dismissal
Rulings in 10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses
Christopher J. Miller

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher J. Miller, Don't Blame Me, Blame the Financial Crisis: A Survey of Dismissal Rulings in 10b-5
Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 273 (2011).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss1/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

“DON’T BLAME ME, BLAME THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS”: A SURVEY OF DISMISSAL RULINGS IN
10b-5 SUITS FOR SUBPRIME SECURITIES LOSSES
Christopher J. Miller*
This Note surveys thirty-four district court decisions on motions to
dismiss in actions brought under SEC Rule 10b-5 for losses suffered during
the recent financial crisis. This Note focuses on issues of scienter and loss
causation, the elements of a 10b-5 claim most likely to be affected by a
market-wide downturn. In the opinions surveyed, successfully pleading
scienter proved the biggest hurdle for plaintiffs in surviving a motion to
dismiss, and this Note proceeds to analyze the factors that influenced
whether a district court found scienter to be adequately pleaded. This Note
also examines efforts by both plaintiffs and defendants to use the financial
crisis of 2007–08 to support their arguments for or against dismissal, again
with particular focus on scienter and loss causation.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers announced that it would file
for bankruptcy. 1 The 150-year-old firm was not the first victim of the
growing crisis—the rushed sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America had
been completed just a few days prior, and earlier that year Bear Stearns had
been forced into the arms of JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2 In response, the
United States stock market suffered its worst daily drop since the

1. See Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 2008, at A1.
2. See Aaron Lucchetti & Robin Sidel, Dow Industrials Take a 504.48-Point Dive,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at C1.
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September 11th terrorist attacks. 3 In October 2010, the IMF estimated total
bank losses from the financial crisis at $2.2 trillion.4
The tidal wave of litigation that has followed in the wake of the financial
crisis has ranged from bribery cases 5 to public nuisance complaints. 6 This
Note focuses only on one aspect of this maelstrom: suits brought under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the federal securities laws. Part I gives
background information on the financial crisis and the federal securities
laws, with a particular focus on the elements of scienter and loss causation.
Part II first gives an overview of securities litigation in the wake of the
crisis. Part II then reviews the dispositions of motions to dismiss in thirtyfour suits for subprime securities losses, concluding that adequately
alleging scienter has been the biggest hurdle for plaintiffs hoping to survive
a motion to dismiss, and then proceeds to analyze issues that have proved
important in adequately alleging scienter. Part III examines the efforts of
plaintiffs and defendants to use the crisis itself to prevail on motions to
dismiss in the thirty-four decisions surveyed. Finally, Part IV provides
concluding observations on securities litigation in the wake of financial
catastrophe.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND SECURITIES LAWS
This part first gives some brief background information on the financial
crisis. Next, the historical development of the federal securities laws is
examined. Finally, this part discusses the evolution of the current standards
for loss causation and scienter in private actions under Rule 10b-5.
A. Financial Crisis: Attack of the Opaque Acronyms
1. Mortgage Loan Origination
Home ownership usually depends on the availability of credit.
Individuals with strong credit histories qualify for traditional mortgages,
while individuals with weaker histories qualify for subprime loans. 7 The
importance of subprime mortgages to the overall mortgage market has
increased over time—the percentage of mortgages originated that were
3. See Craig et al., supra note 1, at A1.
4. INT’L MONETARY FUND, OCTOBER 2010 GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT x
(2010).
5. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, J.P. Morgan Settles Alabama Bribery Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at B1.
6. See City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2010)
(affirming dismissal of City’s claims that subprime foreclosures constituted a public
nuisance caused by defendant financial institutions’ securitization practices).
7. See Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from
the 2007–08 Credit Crisis, in PRUDENT LENDING RESTORED: SECURITIZATION AFTER THE
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 163, 167 (Yasuyuki Fuchita, Richard J. Herring & Robert E. Litan
eds., 2009). Banks customarily have charged higher interest rates to buyers considered to be
at a higher risk of defaulting on their loans based on, for example, poor credit history or a
small down payment compared to the overall value of the loan. See Rick Brooks &
Constance Mitchell Ford, The United States of Subprime, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2007, at A1.
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rated subprime increased from 8.6 percent in 2001 ($190 billion) to 20
percent by 2005 (over $600 billion). 8 Many of these later mortgages were
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). 9 One of the most common subprime
ARMs was given the label “2/28,” because it gave the borrower a low fixed
rate (a “teaser rate”) for the first two years, and then reset to a high variable
rate for the next twenty-eight. 10 After the reset, a buyer’s monthly payment
could jump by 35 percent or more, even if market interest rates had not
changed. 11 For subprime buyers, who often could afford the teaser rate but
not the higher variable rate, this jump would create a need to refinance after
two years in order to afford their monthly payments. 12 Because a
significant number of subprime borrowers had borrowed the entire value of
their home, a decline in housing prices could leave them owing more than
the value of their home (“under water”) and unable to refinance. 13 Without
refinancing, they were likely to default on their monthly payments; thus
ARMs left subprime borrowers with little flexibility to survive a drop in
housing prices. 14
Commercial banks and savings and loan associations were once the
predominant originators of mortgage loans—however, with the advent of
securitization, mortgage bankers 15 and brokers had the majority of the
market share by the 1990s. 16 The market also consolidated: in 1990, 28
percent of the industry’s roughly $500 billion in loans came from the top
twenty-five originators; in 2005, 85 percent of the industry’s $3.1 trillion in
loans did. 17
2. Securitization
Securitization refers to the process of pooling together assets that are not
otherwise easily traded, including mortgages and credit card loans, and
issuing securities that allow investors to receive payments based on cash
flows from that pool. 18 The resulting securities are called asset-backed
securities (ABS), of which mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are one

8. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 167–68. See also David Schmudde, Responding to
the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709,
722–24 (2009).
9. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 167–68.
10. See id.
11. See ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., SUBPRIME AND SYNTHETIC CDOS: STRUCTURE, RISK,
AND VALUATION 11 (2010), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_CDOs_
Structure_Risk_Valuation_0610.pdf.
12. See id.
13. See id.; see also Schmudde, supra note 8, at 719–21.
14. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 11; see also Schmudde, supra note 8, at
719–21.
15. Mortgage banks do not take deposits and are significantly less regulated than
commercial banks; Countrywide is one example. See Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for
Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213, 1254–56, 1272–73 (2010).
16. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 5.
17. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 169.
18. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 5.

2011]

BLAME THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

277

type. 19 Sponsors of MBS purchase the loans from the originators; when a
large enough pool of mortgages is assembled, it is sold to a special purpose
vehicle (SPV) that issues MBS in order to fund its purchase of the
mortgages. 20 MBS are split into “tranches.” 21 Scheduled payments to
some investors—those holding the more senior tranches—are prioritized
over payments to investors holding less senior tranches. 22 These MBS cash
flows represent the interest and principal payments made by the borrowers
whose mortgages are owned by the MBS structures. 23
A hypothetical can help demonstrate how these tranches prioritize
payments. Imagine a MBS has $100 worth of underlying collateral in the
form of residential mortgages. The most senior tranche of this hypothetical
MBS has 20 percent subordination, which means it is entitled to all of the
cash flow from the underlying mortgages until 80 percent of the debt is
satisfied. Thus, if only $80 of the scheduled payments are made, perhaps
because of homeowner defaults, the senior tranche will be paid in full,
while the lower tranches will receive nothing. Each tranche is rated by
rating agencies for its investment quality, with the most senior tranches
receiving AAA ratings and the less senior, riskier tranches receiving lower
ratings. 24
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) share many traits with MBS.
CDOs have been around since the late 1980s, but their growth as an asset
class occurred primarily after 2000. 25 A CDO has been analogized to “a
small, privately held finance firm with a [limited] lifespan.”26 A CDO is an
independent legal entity that owns assets such as MBS. 27 A cash-based
CDO issues debt classes, and pays them with the cash flows from the MBS
it owns. 28 Synthetic CDOs, meanwhile, derive their cash flows from credit
default swaps (CDS), a form of credit insurance on a portfolio of reference
entities, which could include high-grade corporate bonds, but might also
include MBS. 29 As with MBS, all CDO debt classes are divided into
19. Id. Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) are an even more specific subclassification of ABSs that distinguishes securities derived from residential mortgages from
securities based upon commercial mortgages.
20. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 170.
21. Tranche is the French word for slice. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY, 1327 (11th ed. 2003). Each tranche is a slice of the entity as a whole owned by
a class of investors with certain rights. Id.
22. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 169.
23. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 8.
24. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 170. The ratings given by rating agencies are
based upon the perceived likelihood that an investment will fail. The most senior tranche in
MBS would receive the highest rating, AAA, because it was considered extremely unlikely
that so many of the mortgages pooled into the MBS would default that the lower tranches
would be unable to absorb the entire loss. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF
CAPITALISM 52 (2009).
25. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 8; JANET M. TAVAKOLI, COLLATERALIZED
DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 6–13 (2003).
26. BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 8.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 14. The cash stream is derived from the premiums paid on the CDSs by
the insured. See id.; TAVAKOLI, supra note 25, at 31.
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tranches by seniority. 30 A key difference between cash-based and synthetic
CDOs is the way liabilities are funded: cash-based CDOs are fully funded,
meaning that investors pay in advance for their bonds. 31 Synthetic CDOs,
however, include an unfunded class (usually the super-senior tranches) that
need not put any money down initially, but may be subject to calls requiring
them to put up cash to fund payments should large credit events (e.g., mass
defaults in the underlying assets) significantly disrupt cash flow. 32 Finally,
adding to the complexity, CDOs will sometimes own tranches of other
CDOs as part of their portfolio; depending on the portion of the portfolio
that consists of other CDOs, these may be referred to as CDOs-squared. 33
3. Crisis
Housing prices began to decline nationally by mid-2006, dropping by
about 1.5 percent between 2006 and 2007.34 Interest rates increased at a
time when over two million homeowners faced the first interest-rate resets
on their ARMs. 35 Moreover, the rating agency Fitch found that poor
underwriting standards and outright fraud were driving the
underperformance of many subprime loans.36
With default rates unexpectedly high, banks sought to enforce repurchase
agreements, requiring lenders to buy back troubled mortgages. 37 These
thinly capitalized loan originators faced financial distress—by the end of
2007, more than twenty-five subprime mortgage originators had filed for
bankruptcy, including New Century Financial Corp.38 Nor was the wave of
bankruptcies limited to subprime lenders; even lenders without significant
subprime portfolios fell as investors fled the mortgage market. 39 The
unexpectedly high default rates on subprime mortgages also caused rating
agencies to downgrade their ratings of MBS and CDOs. 40 Financial
institutions then had to write down these assets as their value became
impaired. 41 Because of these write-downs, firms needed to raise capital to
meet regulatory requirements by selling unwanted mortgage-related assets;
with so many firms seeking to do so at the same time, the market for these
assets was glutted and illiquid, and firms faced steep discounts on asset
30. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 8.
31. See id. at 15.
32. See id. at 14–15; TAVAKOLI, supra note 25, at 197.
33. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 13.
34. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 180.
35. See id.
36. See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch: Underwriting & Fraud Significant Drivers
of Subprime Defaults; New Originator Reviews (Nov. 28, 2007), available at
www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/Fitch_Originators_1128.pdf.
37. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Banks Go on Subprime Offensive, WALL ST. J., Mar.
13, 2007, at A3.
38. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 182.
39. See American Home Mortgage Seeks Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at C3; Kemba J. Dunham, Subprime Woes Slap Other Lenders, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at B7.
40. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 183.
41. See id. at 182–84; see also POSNER, supra note 24, at 68.
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prices. 42 The write-downs and deeply discounted asset sales raised fears in
the market about the creditworthiness of financial institutions. 43 The result
was a run on the funding of banks; while “in the Great Depression,
depositors of commercial banks withdrew their deposits, here providers of
capital withdrew secured and unsecured funding from banks.” 44 The
impact on the financial services sector was massive—Bear Stearns and
Merrill Lynch were sold, 45 Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, 46 and Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs became commercial bank holding companies
instead of investment banks. 47 The damage was not contained to the
financial services sector: commercial banks, including IndyMac Bancorp,
were taken into federal receivership.48 The federal government also seized
control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 49 and the troubled insurance giant
AIG. 50
Total losses from the financial collapse are estimated in the trillions, and
responses by governments and private actors have varied widely. 51 The
private 10b-5 action is one tool by which investors have sought to recoup
their losses, which is especially fitting considering the historical context in
which that action developed.
B. The Securities Acts
Modern securities laws have their origins in another historic financial
catastrophe: the stock market crash of 1929. 52 The “industrial prosperity”
of the decade leading up to the Great Depression led to a historic rise in the
trading, valuation, and underwriting of securities. 53 Many Americans
gambled on securities with borrowed funds, often making no attempt to
establish whether the prices had any foundation in the success of the issuing
companies. 54 The lack of fair dealing by some underwriters and dealers
aided this speculation—such distributors made statements to prospective
purchasers without proper investigation of their truth, and used misleading
literature and high-pressure sales tactics. 55 Once the rampant speculation
42. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 183–84; see also POSNER, supra note 24, at 66–67.
43. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 183–84.
44. Id.
45. See Luchetti & Sidel, supra note 2.
46. See Craig et al., supra note 1.
47. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bajaj, Radical Shift for Goldman and Morgan, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at A1 (“Now, the firms will look more like commercial banks, with
more disclosure, higher capital reserves and less risk-taking.”).
48. Robin Sidel, Bank Fears Spread After Seizure of IndyMac, WALL ST. J., July 14,
2008, at A1.
49. Charles Duhigg et al., As Crisis Grew, a Few Options Shrank to One, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2008, at A1.
50. Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central
Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1.
51. See generally INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 4.
52. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194–95 (1976).
53. See EDWARD T. MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT AND THE S.E.C.
18 (1948).
54. See id.
55. See id. at 19–20.
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reached its breaking point, the severity of the stock market crash and the
sheer number of people who suffered losses “led inevitably to [calls] for
legislative reform.” 56
The main focus of the resulting legislation was ensuring proper
disclosure of information by issuers and underwriters. Within a month of
his inauguration, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a message to
Congress emphasizing the importance of information disclosure, stating that
his government had “an obligation . . . to insist that every issue of new
securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full
publicity and information, and that no essentially important element
attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.”57 With this
aim in mind, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (‘33 Act), which
protects investors by requiring extensive disclosures before new securities
are issued. 58 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act) expanded this
protection by requiring periodic disclosures with respect to previously
issued securities in order to prevent the manipulation of stock prices.59 The
‘34 Act also created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
oversee enforcement and rulemaking under both the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts. 60
1. Section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act and Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) is arguably the most important and expansive provision of
the Securities Acts, providing the SEC with broad authority to prohibit
manipulative or deceptive conduct connected with the purchase or sale of a
security. 61 Under section 10(b), it is unlawful to:
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. 62

In 1942, the SEC used its congressionally authorized rulemaking
authority to enact Rule 10b-5, which specifically describes the conduct
barred by section 10(b). 63 Though Rule 10b-5 would ultimately prove to be
one of the foremost anti-fraud provisions in federal law, its creation was not
the result of precise and careful legislative deliberation. Instead, the Rule
was “a hastily drafted response to a situation clearly involving intentional
misconduct.” 64 The SEC had learned that the president of a corporation
56. See id. at 20.
57. 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
58. 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)); see also Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194–95 (1976) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, at 1-5 (1933)).
59. 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006)) (‘34 Act).
60. Id. § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006).
61. See Nicholas Fortune Schanbaum, Scheme Liability: Rule 10b-5(a) and Secondary
Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26 REV. LITIG. 183, 186 (2007).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
64. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 n.32 (1976).
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was telling shareholders that the corporation was doing poorly and
purchasing their shares at low prices, when in fact the company was doing
exceptionally well. 65 The rule was drafted and approved on the day the
SEC learned of this misconduct. 66
Rule 10b-5 is “as broad as almost any statute, a sort of long-arm
provision in which the SEC forbids everything the statute gives it power to
forbid.” 67 Despite this breadth, Congress has never expressly provided for
a private right of action for violation of section 10(b). 68 Since 1946,
however, courts have recognized that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 create
an implied private right of action. 69 While some commentators have
objected that implying a private right of action goes against congressional
intent, 70 the United States Supreme Court itself has stated that the implied
remedy’s “existence . . . is simply beyond peradventure.” 71
2. Loss Causation and Scienter: Common Law Development
The implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 “resembles, but is
not identical to, common-law tort actions for deceit and
misrepresentation.” 72 The Supreme Court has identified six elements of a
claim for securities fraud under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with
the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance (transaction causation), (5)
economic loss, and (6) loss causation. 73 This Note focuses on loss
causation and scienter. These two elements of a plaintiff’s claim are most
likely to be affected by the global financial crisis. In regards to loss
causation, this is because of the issue of intervening causation—the
possibility that the investor’s loss was caused by the market-wide downturn

65. Id.
66. Id. Rule 10b-5 states in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
67. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 463 (1990).
68. See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-MarketBased Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 33 (2008).
69. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 & n.10 (1983) (citing Kardon
v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) as the first time a private right of
action under Rule 10b-5 was recognized).
70. See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under
the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 62 (2004).
71. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 380.
72. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
73. See id. at 341–42.
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in share prices and not the defendant’s misrepresentations. 74 In regards to
scienter, this is because of the rule against pleading “fraud by hindsight” to
hold defendants responsible for failing to predict future events.75 Some
scholars predicted that these two elements would be most difficult for
plaintiffs to prove in the wake of the financial collapse.76
a. Loss Causation
In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 77 the Second Circuit recognized
the term “loss causation” as a required component of a 10b-5 claim. 78 The
court opined that loss causation can be demonstrated “rather easily by proof
of some form of economic damage,” compared with the reliance element of
transaction causation.79 Indeed, transaction causation received more
attention by courts than loss causation for many years, until the Supreme
Court greatly eased a plaintiff’s burden by accepting the “fraud on the
market” theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 80 creating a rebuttable
presumption of reliance where materially misleading statements are
disseminated into a well-developed, impersonal market. 81
Courts continued to emphasize loss causation’s foundation in common
law tort, with Judge Richard Posner going so far as to state that “what
securities lawyers call ‘loss causation’ is the standard common law fraud
rule . . . merely borrowed for use in federal securities fraud cases.” 82 The
Second Circuit, meanwhile, has stated that the “tort analogy is imperfect”
because while “[a] foreseeable injury at common law is one proximately
caused by the defendant’s fault,” devaluation of a security is caused by “the
underlying circumstance that is concealed or misstated,” not the
Despite these differences, the common law
misstatement itself.83
development of the loss causation element informed its ultimate
codification in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 84
(PSLRA).
b. Scienter
The requirement that any material misstatements be made with scienter is
perhaps less intuitive than the requirement of a causal connection between
74. See infra Parts I.B.4.a.ii, III.B, and IV.B.2.
75. See infra Parts I.B.4.b, III.A, and IV.B.1.
76. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 204–14.
77. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974).
78. See id. at 380.
79. Id. Transaction causation involves showing “that the violations in question caused
the [plaintiff] to engage in the transaction in question.” Id.
80. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
81. See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94
IOWA L. REV. 811, 817–19 (2009).
82. Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1990).
83. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2005).
84. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); see Fisch, supra note 81, at 822.
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the misstatements and the loss suffered by an investor. Indeed, in the thirtyyear period following the establishment of a private right of action under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, “[c]ourts and commentators . . . differed with
regard to whether scienter is a necessary element of such a cause of action,
or whether negligent conduct alone is sufficient.” 85 The Supreme Court
resolved this dispute in 1976 with its decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
The Court held that Congress’s use of the word
Hochfelder. 86
“manipulative” and other words indicative of intentional or willful conduct
indicated congressional intent to proscribe a type of wrongful conduct
exceeding negligence. 87
The Circuit Courts of Appeals were in agreement that the heightened
pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applied to this
scienter element. 88 Rule 9(b) requires the circumstances of a fraud to be
pleaded with particularity, but allows that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” 89 The
Circuits split, however, on the interpretation of Rule 9(b) in the securities
context. The Ninth Circuit had the least demanding standard, merely
requiring a plaintiff to state that scienter existed.90 On the opposite end of
the spectrum, the Second Circuit had the most demanding standard,
requiring a plaintiff to state, with particularity, facts that give rise to a
“strong inference” of scienter. 91 The uncertainty and inconsistency arising
from this split in standards was one of the reasons that Congress enacted the
PSLRA.
3. Congress Acts: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
The PSLRA codified the judicially developed elements of a section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 claim, including loss causation and scienter. In 1995,
Congress sought to “reassert its authority” in the area of 10b-5 litigation.92
Organized efforts to reform private securities litigation had begun in 1991,
when the “Big Six” accounting firms and the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants began to build bipartisan support for
legislative action to rein in what they saw as an overly plaintiff-friendly

85. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 199.
88. See James B. Fipp, Case Note, How Strong Is Strong Enough?: The Tellabs Court
Lacked the Needed Strength for Pleading Scienter in Securities Fraud, 8 WYO. L. REV. 629,
636 (2008) (citing In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546 (9th Cir. 1994)); see
also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1127–28 (2d Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to securities fraud);
Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) applies to actions brought under the federal securities laws).
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
90. See In re GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546–47.
91. See Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128.
92. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4–5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683–84.

284

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

system of securities litigation. 93 Congress enacted the PSLRA in order to
combat abusive practices in private securities litigation. 94 Congress was
concerned primarily with preventing “strike suits”—shareholder suits filed
solely for their settlement value, not because of a meritorious claim.95
Faced with expensive discovery, “deep pocket” defendants would settle
otherwise non-meritorious claims, and cases were generally “settled based
not on the merits but on the size of the defendant’s pocketbook.” 96
The PSLRA had three primary goals: “(1) to encourage the voluntary
disclosure of information by corporate issuers; (2) to empower investors so
that they—not their lawyers—exercise primary control over private
securities litigation; and (3) to encourage plaintiffs’ lawyers to pursue valid
claims and defendants to fight abusive claims.” 97 To that end, the PSLRA
sought to heighten and standardize the pleading requirements for section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 suits. Congress adopted the Second Circuit’s
standard for pleading scienter,98 requiring that a plaintiff must “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.” 99 Congress did not, however, define the
key term “strong inference,” leaving it up to the Supreme Court to clarify
the standard at a later time. 100
As to loss causation, the PSLRA stated only that “the plaintiff shall have
the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to
violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover
damages.” 101 Thus, while the PSLRA codified the elements of a section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 suit, it left the details of the pleading standards to be
determined by the courts.

93. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs,
Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1018 (1996).
94. See David S. Escoffery, Note, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule
10b-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1809 (2000).
95. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4–5, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 683; see also H.R.
REP. NO. 104-50, at 15 (1995) (“Strike lawsuits are lawsuits filed by class action attorneys
on behalf of shareholders whose once attractive stock purchases have failed to live up to
their expectations. Volatile stock prices, rapid product development, and technological
changes make growing companies a target. As a result, high technology, biotechnology, and
other growth companies are hardest hit.”).
96. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 9, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 688.
97. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 683.
98. Id. at 15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694. The Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs “chose a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading
standard of the Second Circuit.” Id. The Senate Committee noted, however, that it did “not
intend to codify the Second Circuit’s caselaw interpreting this pleading standard, although
courts may find this body of law instructive.” Id.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2) (2006).
100. See infra Part I.B.4.b.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(4).
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4. The Supreme Court Clarifies: Dura and Tellabs
This section explains the current state of the pleading requirements for
loss causation and scienter in light of the Supreme Court’s most recent
decisions on the topic. First, this section analyzes the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo. This section also
examines a Second Circuit opinion that directly addressed the effect of an
intervening cause on pleading loss causation, Lentell v. Merrill Lynch &
Co. Finally, this section discusses the Supreme Court’s decision addressing
scienter, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
a. Loss Causation: Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo and Lentell v.
Merrill Lynch & Co.
i. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 102 the Supreme Court
formalized the requirement that a misrepresentation must be the proximate
cause of a 10b-5 plaintiff’s loss. The Ninth Circuit had ruled that a plaintiff
may satisfy the loss causation element solely by demonstrating that the
price of the stock was inflated on the date of purchase. 103 A unanimous
Supreme Court overruled, holding that the plaintiff must prove that the
alleged misrepresentation is the proximate cause of the loss suffered.104
The Court reasoned that while purchasing stock at a price inflated by a
misrepresentation might often lead to a later loss, it is far from invariably
Rather, “that lower price may reflect, not the earlier
so. 105
misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor
expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or
other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of
102. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
103. See id. at 343. There is currently a split between the circuits on the pleading
standard for loss causation after Dura. See Evan Hill, Note, The Rule 10b-5 Suit: Loss
Causation Pleading Standards in Private Securities Fraud Claims After Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2677–78 (2010). The Fifth and
Ninth Circuits require a plaintiff to allege the misrepresentations plausibly caused their loss.
See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 258 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Gilead Scis. Sec.
Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). The Fifth Circuit explicitly interprets this
plausible causation requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), while the Ninth
Circuit “also appears to consider FRCP 8(a) appropriate, although without expressly stating
so.” Hill, supra, at 2677–78. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have a more stringent
standard, with the Fourth Circuit explicitly applying FRCP Rule 9(b) and the Seventh Circuit
requiring plaintiffs to plead the “very facts” that caused their loss. See id. Finally, plaintiffs
in the Second Circuit must satisfy a two-part test in pleading loss causation, and demonstrate
that (1) the loss was foreseeable and (2) within the zone of the risk of the misrepresentation.
See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173; see also ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d
87, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying Lentell’s two-part test after Dura). Significantly for
this Note, the Second Circuit does not specify the stringency of pleading, instead stating that
loss causation is a “fact-based inquiry and the degree of difficulty in pleading will be
affected by [the] circumstances.” Lentell, 396 F.3d at 174.
104. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.
105. Id.
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that lower price.” 106 This “tangle of factors” affecting price requires a
plaintiff to prove that the misrepresentation caused a loss. 107
Building on its holding that a plaintiff need prove proximate causation
and economic loss, the Court moved on to discuss the requirement that a
plaintiff plead such a loss. 108 In doing so, the Court presumed the
applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to loss causation,
which requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” 109 The Court noted that ordinary pleading
standards do not impose a high burden on plaintiffs, but indicated that it
“should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff . . . to provide a defendant
with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff
has in mind.” 110
ii. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.
The Dura Court did not consider any other issues surrounding loss
causation, and thus did not directly consider the effect an intervening event
might have. The Second Circuit in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 111
however, delved deeper into the effect a non-fraud explanation might have
on pleading loss causation.
The plaintiffs in Lentell were a group of investors who alleged that
Merrill Lynch, through its “star analyst” Henry M. Blodget, issued false and
misleading reports recommending that investors purchase shares of two
companies, 24/7 Real Media, Inc. and Interliant, Inc. 112 The crux of the
plaintiffs’ complaint was that between May 12, 1999 and February 20,
2001, Merrill Lynch recommended that investors buy stock in the two
companies not because they were actually sound investments, but instead to
further Merrill Lynch’s banking-client relationship with the companies and
increase their share price.113 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint for failure to plead
loss causation, among other deficiencies.114
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, establishing a two-part test
for pleading loss causation. 115 The court emphasized that proximate
causation in securities fraud suits differs from causation in other torts in that
the loss is not caused directly by the defendant’s fault, but by the
underlying circumstance that is concealed or misstated. 116 Thus, the court
held, a plaintiff must plead “both that the loss be foreseeable and that the
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 346.
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.
110. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347.
111. 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005).
112. See id. at 164.
113. See id. at 166–67.
114. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351,
362 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
115. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173.
116. See id.
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loss be caused by the materialization of the concealed risk.” 117 Merrill
Lynch did not actually conceal or misstate any of the actual underlying
risks associated with an investment in 24/7 Media or Interliant; instead, the
plaintiffs alleged that Merrill Lynch falsely recommended investment in
those companies. 118 Thus, because the plaintiffs did not allege that it was
the falsity of these recommendations that caused the decline in their stock
value, they did not properly plead loss causation. 119
In the course of its opinion, the Second Circuit also discussed the impact
a non-fraud explanation may have on pleading loss causation in one key
passage. 120 After beginning by noting that “[l]oss causation is a fact-based
inquiry and the degree of difficulty in pleading will be affected by the
circumstances,” 121 the Second Circuit quoted Emergent Capital Investment
Management, LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc. 122 for the proposition that “[i]f
[a plaintiff’s] loss was caused by an intervening event, like a general fall in
the price of Internet stocks, the chain of causation . . . is a matter of proof at
trial and not to be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”123 In the
next sentence, however, the court quoted First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt
Funding Corp. 124 for the proposition that “when the plaintiff’s loss
coincides with a market-wide phenomenon causing comparable losses to
other investors, the prospect that the plaintiff’s loss was caused by the fraud
decreases,” and a plaintiff’s claim fails when “it has not adequately [pled]
facts which, if proven, would show that its loss was caused by the alleged
misstatements as opposed to intervening events.” 125
As one district court has observed,
[T]his passage lacks clarity. It provides no explanation for how “a
general fall in the price of Internet stocks” is distinguishable from “a
marketwide phenomenon causing comparable losses to other investors”—
the former of which is a matter for proof at trial, while the latter can be a
sufficient basis on which to dismiss a complaint. 126

Thus, district courts have had unclear guidance as they grapple with issues
of loss causation in the wake of the financial crisis.
b. Scienter: Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 the Supreme Court
considered the then-extant split between the circuits on the level of
117. Id.
118. See id. at 175.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 174.
121. Id.
122. 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
123. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 174 (quoting Emergent, 343 F.3d at 197).
124. 27 F.3d 763 (2d Cir. 1994).
125. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 174 (quoting Gelt, 27 F.3d at 772).
126. King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 343
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
127. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
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particularity required to give rise to a “strong inference” of scienter under
the PSLRA. 128 Some courts permitted securities fraud plaintiffs to allege
the requisite mental state simply by stating that it existed, while others
required plaintiffs to allege with particularity facts giving rise to an
inference of scienter. 129
The Supreme Court framed its task as prescribing a “workable
construction” of the “strong inference” standard, with an eye towards
maintaining the twin goals of the PSLRA: curbing “frivolous, lawyerdriven litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to recover on
meritorious claims.” 130 The Court set out three prescriptions. First, courts
must, as in all motions to dismiss, accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true. 131 Second, courts must consider the complaint in its
entirety, as well as other sources traditionally examined in ruling on a
motion to dismiss, such as documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference and matters amenable to judicial notice.132 This inquiry is a
holistic one: the question is whether all the facts collectively give rise to a
strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation does.133
Finally, the inquiry has a comparative element; courts are required to “take
into account plausible opposing inferences,” and deny the motion to dismiss
only if the inference of scienter is “at least as compelling as any opposing
inference.” 134
While the surest route to scienter is to plead that the defendants
possessed a pecuniary motive to commit fraud, the Court stated that the
“absence of a motive allegation is not fatal.” 135 Indeed, the Court noted
without expressly deciding that every circuit court that has considered the
issue has held that a plaintiff may allege scienter by showing that the
defendant acted either intentionally or recklessly. 136 The Court held that to
plead scienter adequately, the plaintiff must “plead facts rendering an
inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing
inference.” 137 Meeting this standard has proven to be the major roadblock
for plaintiffs in subprime securities suits to allow their 10b-5 claims to
survive a motion to dismiss. 138
A basic concept of particular import to pleading scienter successfully in
the wake of financial collapse is the distinction between ex ante
expectations and ex post losses. The Tellabs Court cited with approval 139 a

128. Id. at 319–20.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 322.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 322–23.
134. See id. at 323–24.
135. Id. at 325.
136. See id. at 319–20 & n.3.
137. Id. at 328.
138. See infra Part II.B.
139. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 320 (citing Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124,
1129 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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1978 case, Denny v. Barber. 140 Denny stands for the proposition that a
plaintiff may not simply seize upon disclosures made in later reports and
allege they should have been made sooner; this was termed “fraud by
hindsight” by Judge Henry Friendly. 141 The plaintiffs had alleged that
Chase Manhattan Bank had engaged in fraud, evidenced by inadequate
disclosure of risky loans that eventually resulted in significant losses.142
The court held that failure to predict events that contributed to the
realization of those losses, including a drastic increase in petroleum prices,
did not constitute fraud.143 In the absence of allegations that the defendants
perceived or were reckless in not perceiving these risks at the time they
made their disclosures, plaintiffs did not adequately allege scienter.144
Given the fact that the subprime mortgage meltdown and the ensuing credit
crisis 145 were not predicted by many sophisticated parties, 146 it is not
surprising that this distinction has featured prominently in many subprime
securities suits. 147
II. DISPOSITIONS OF MOTIONS TO DISMISS IN 10B-5
SUBPRIME SECURITIES SUITS
In this part, this Note surveys district court decisions involving 10b-5
suits stemming from the subprime mortgage collapse and credit crisis.
First, this part provides an overview of the securities class actions filed
during and after the crisis, and proceeds to analyze the dispositions of
thirty-four decisions on motions to dismiss in subprime securities suits. In
this sampling of cases, scienter was the most important factor in
determining whether a complaint survives. Finally, this part discusses
factual and legal issues that influenced whether a plaintiff’s scienter
allegations were held to be adequate.
A. Securities Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis
As the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 evolved into the global financial
crisis of 2008, a wave of securities litigation followed. At the end of 2007,
thirty-seven financial crisis-related cases had been filed in federal court,

140. 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978).
141. Id. at 470.
142. See id. at 469.
143. See id. at 470.
144. See id.
145. See supra Part I.A.
146. See, e.g., Benjamin S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure & Competition (May
17, 2007) (“[G]iven the fundamental factors in place that should support the demand for
housing, we believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the broader housing
market will likely be limited, and we do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime
market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system.”), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm.
147. See infra Part III.A.
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thirty of which were filed in the last two quarters of that year.148 While this
accounted for only 22 percent of the 163 federal securities class action
lawsuits filed in 2007, 149 that number would soon rise.
2008 saw ninety-nine financial crisis related class action lawsuits filed,
making up 47 percent of the 210 securities class actions registered in that
year. 150 The targets of these suits shifted from loan originators in 2007 to
defendants involved in loan securitization in 2008, reflecting the spreading
exposure of investment banks to the growing financial crisis.151 Indeed,
while the number of loan originators named as defendants in 2008 (twentytwo) remained steady compared to 2007 (nineteen), the percentage of
financial crisis-related filings with loan originator defendants fell from 51
percent in 2007 to just 22 percent in 2008. 152
The rate of new federal securities class action filings tapered off
somewhat in 2009 with 155 new cases. 153 This drop was most likely
attributable to the decline in financial crisis-related cases from ninety-nine
in 2008 to fifty-one in 2009, representing approximately 33 percent of the
total class actions filed in 2009. 154 One trend worth noting in 2009 was the
length of time between the end of the class period and the filing date—at
218 days, this was almost double the annual average of 114 days in the
years between the passage of the PSLRA in 1995 and 2009, and 71 percent
higher than the average of 127 days observed in 2008. 155 This could
suggest that plaintiffs’ attorneys were refocusing on non-financial crisis
matters. 156 Indeed, as of the end of 2010, the storm of filings seems to have
subsided. Only nineteen financial crisis-related securities suits were filed,
while the overall number of securities class action filings rose to 174.157
B. Overview of Subprime Securities Decisions Surveyed:
Methodology and Dispositions
This section examines decisions on motions to dismiss in thirty-four
securities class actions for losses stemming from the subprime mortgage

148. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 30 (2008),
available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY
%20FINAL.PDF.
149. See id.; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2009 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 6
(2009), available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-10-0559%20SEC%20LIT%20STUDY_
V7%20PRINT.PDF.
150. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2009 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY, supra
note 149, at 7.
151. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY, supra
note 148, at 34.
152. Id. at 31.
153. See 2009 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 149, at 6–7.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2010 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 7–9 (2010),
available
at
http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-11-0484%20SEC%20LIT%20STUDY_
V6BONLINE.PDF.
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collapse and subsequent credit crisis. 158 Of these thirty-four decisions,
twenty denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s 10b-5 claims
at least in part.159 Eleven granted dismissal in full. 160 Three dismissed the
plaintiffs’ 10b-5 claims, but allowed the plaintiffs’ other claims to
proceed. 161 Subsequent to the district court rulings, three dismissals have
been affirmed by Circuit Courts of Appeals, 162 and one case proceeded to
trial, resulting in a jury verdict for the plaintiff. 163
Given the importance of lending practices to the overall financial
collapse, 164 it is perhaps not surprising that the most common allegation
levied by plaintiffs was that the defendants misrepresented the strength of
their underwriting standards for issuing mortgage loans or insuring financial
products with exposure to subprime. To use In re New Century 165 as an
example, a defendant might describe its underwriting standards to investors
as “improved” or “strict.” 166 If the company’s loan underwriting standards

158. See Table I. To identify these cases, this Note started with Kevin LaCroix’s
extraordinarily useful list of dispositions in credit crisis-related lawsuits. Kevin M. LaCroix,
The List:
Subprime Lawsuit Dismissals and Denials Decisions (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.oakbridgeins.com/clients/blog/subprimeresolution.doc. As of July 16, 2011,
LaCroix’s list consisted of seventy-nine grants and fifty-nine denials of motions to dismiss.
This Note used the following methodology to narrow the list to thirty-four decisions. First,
multiple decisions in the same case and cases in which plaintiffs did not assert 10b-5 claims
were removed. Next, to focus on subprime securities suits, this Note omitted cases that were
not putative class actions, claims for losses unrelated to subprime (such as auction rate
securities and student loans), and decisions other than on the merits, for example dismissals
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. There are certainly many other useful ways to analyze
this data, and the question of whether a particular case does or does not qualify as
“subprime-related” was often a close one. The goal of this Note is not to be exhaustive, but
to analyze a representative sampling of decisions.
159. See Table I.
160. Id.
161. The other claims were under the ‘33 Act, which prohibits misleading statements
made in connection with registration statements and prospectuses. See In re Wachovia
Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 366–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing 10b-5 claims
but allowing ‘33 Act claims to proceed); In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative &
ERISA Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 744, 762 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (same); Local 295/Local 851
IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust & Welfare Fund v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d 689
(S.D. Ohio 2010) (same); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. Because this Note
focuses on the viability of 10b-5 claims at the motion to dismiss stage, these three decisions
are considered dismissals for the remaining discussion.
162. In re HomeBanc Corp. Sec. Litig., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Kadel v. Flood, No. 10-12220, 2011 WL 2015379 (11th Cir. May 24, 2011); Pittleman
v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., No. SACV 07-0970, 2009 WL 648983 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9,
2009), aff’d sub nom. Sharenow v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir.
2010); In re 2007 Novastar Fin., Inc., Sec. Litig., 07-0139-CV, 2008 WL 2354367 (W.D.
Mo. June 4, 2008), aff’d, 579 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2009).
163. See Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2009 WL 3261941
(S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009); Nathan Koppel, Jury Finds Bankers Misled Loan Risk, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 19, 2010, at C3. Trial verdicts in securities class actions are exceedingly rare: since
the passage of the PSLRA in 1995, 3,400 securities class actions have been filed in federal
court but only twenty-eight have gone to trial. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 15.
164. See supra notes 34–49 and accompanying text.
165. 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
166. See id. at 1225.
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are actually lax, this may be an actionable misstatement.167 If the defendant
is aware or should be aware that the standards are lax, he has made the
misstatement with scienter. 168 Twenty-three of the thirty-four decisions
reviewed in this Note included allegations about underwriting standards: in
thirteen of these decisions, 10b-5 claims survived the motion to dismiss,169
while in ten the 10b-5 claims did not. 170 The plaintiffs in the remainder of
the decisions alleged misrepresentations that included the scope of the
defendant’s exposure to subprime either directly171 or indirectly through

167. See id. In the cases examined, district courts have split on whether statements
portraying underwriting practices as “strong” may be material misstatements actionable as
securities fraud. Compare In re Sec. Capital Assurance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d
569, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding statements about company’s “conservative” underwriting
approach to be “classic examples” of inactionable corporate puffery), with In re Ambac Fin.
Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241, 271–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding statements
about company’s “conservative” underwriting approach actionable, because once a
defendant “affirmatively characterizes management practices as . . . ‘conservative,’” the
subject is “in play” and the defendant is “bound to speak truthfully” (quoting Shapiro v. UJB
Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 1992))), and In re CIT Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08
Civ. 6613, 2010 WL 2365846 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010) (holding that touting
“conservative” lending practices puts the subject “in play” (citing Ambac, 693 F. Supp. 2d at
271)).
168. See New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1229–30.
169. In re Citigroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 240, 244–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(dismissing allegations related to mortgage underwriting but allowing claims related to CDO
exposure to proceed); In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511, 530–
32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re CIT, 2010 WL 2365846, at *2–3; Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin.
Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re MBIA, Inc. Sec. Litig., 700 F. Supp.
2d 566, 586–87, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing underwriting allegations but allowing
claims related to CDO exposure to continue); Ambac 693 F. Supp. 2d at 271; In re PMI Grp.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C08-1405, 2009 WL 3681669, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009); In re
Wash. Mut., Inc. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1206–07 (W.D.
Wash. 2009); Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-Civ, 2009 WL
3261941, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009); In re RAIT Fin. Trust Sec. Litig., 07-cv-03148,
2008 WL 5378164, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2008); New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1210;
In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145–47 (C.D. Cal. 2008);
Atlas v. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149–50 (S.D. Cal.
2008).
170. In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Local
295/Local 851 IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust & Welfare Fund v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731
F. Supp. 2d 689, 706–07, 717 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (dismissing 10b-5 claims but allowing other
claims to proceed); In re HomeBanc Corp. Sec. Litig., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1343 (N.D. Ga.
2010), aff’d sub nom. Kadel v. Flood, No. 10–12220, 2011 WL 2015379 (11th Cir. May 24,
2011); In re Sec. Capital Assurance, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 580; N.Y. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.
v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 07-CV-5756, 2010 WL 1473265, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010);
Fulton Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., No. 08-C-0458, 2010 WL 601364, at *1
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 18, 2010); In re Downey Sec. Litig., No. CV 08-3261, 2009 WL 2767670, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009); Pittleman v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., No. SACV 070970, 2009 WL 648983, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Sharenow v. Impac
Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir. 2010); In re 2007 Novastar Fin., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 07-0139-CV, 2008 WL 2354367, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 4, 2008), aff’d, 579 F.3d 878
(8th Cir. 2009); Tripp v. Indymac Fin., Inc., No. CV 07-1635, 2007 WL 4591930, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2007).
171. See, e.g., In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1204–05
(D.N.M. 2010).
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MBS and CDOs, 172 adequacy of internal controls and risk management, 173
and in one case, a rating agency’s independence and methodology. 174
These thirty-four decisions included defendants involved in all of the
different stages of creating MBS and CDOs, from loan originators, to
insurers of mortgages and financial products based on mortgages, to the
broker-dealers and investment banks that traded in these products.175 The
type of defendant was not particularly predictive of the outcome of the
motion to dismiss: for example, loan originators, who were the defendants
in seventeen of the thirty-four decisions, succeeded in dismissing the 10b-5
claims against them in seven cases. 176 The majority of the decisions came
from district courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits, which accounted for
thirteen and nine of the decisions surveyed by this Note, respectively. 177 In
this sampling, plaintiffs in the Second Circuit fared particularly well,
surviving motions to dismiss in ten of thirteen cases. 178 The relatively
small number of decisions discussed here, however, should caution against
concluding that the Circuit in which the claim was brought was
determinative of the outcome.
Rather, the question of whether or not the plaintiff adequately alleged
scienter was dispositive in almost every case. One early examination of
securities class actions in the wake of the financial collapse indicated that
scienter was a “perfect predictor” of the outcome of motions to dismiss
subprime securities suits. 179 This trend is apparent in the cases surveyed by
this Note. Only one decision that found a plaintiff’s scienter allegations
sufficient went on to dismiss that case. 180 The importance of scienter is
further underscored by the three cases in which the 10b-5 claims were
dismissed but ‘33 Act claims were permitted to proceed: unlike 10b-5,
actions under the ‘33 Act do not require scienter allegations.181

172. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d
423 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Citigroup, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 236–38; In re Regions Morgan Keegan
Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 744, 759–62 (W.D. Tenn. 2010)
(dismissing 10b-5 claims but allowing other claims to proceed); Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local 773 Pension Fund v. Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d 287
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting dismissal); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 689 F. Supp. 2d 629
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying dismissal); In re Huntington Bancshares, Inc. Sec. Litig., 674
F. Supp. 2d 951 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (granting dismissal); In re Moneygram Int’l, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 626 F. Supp. 2d 947 (D. Minn. 2009) (denying dismissal).
173. See, e.g., In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
174. In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
175. See Table I.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Jonathan Eisenberg, Subprime Securities Class Action Decisions: Who’s Winning,
Who’s Losing and Why?, 3 BLOOMBERG L. REP. CLASS ACTIONS, no. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.skadden.com/content/Publications/Publications1962_0.pdf.
180. See In re Sec. Capital Assurance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 569, 598–602
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding misstatements made with scienter actionable but dismissing for
failure to plead loss causation).
181. See In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 366–78 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 744,
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Because properly alleging scienter has proved the biggest hurdle for
plaintiffs in surviving motions to dismiss, an inquiry into the types of
allegations that have been held to provide the required “strong inference” of
scienter and those that have been held insufficient is warranted. The reader
should bear in mind in the following discussion, however, that under
Tellabs a district court must “consider the complaint in its entirety” in
determining whether a strong inference of scienter is pleaded.182 Thus no
one type of fact or conduct alleged is by itself dispositive of scienter; rather,
it is the combination of the totality of the allegations and circumstances that
determines the outcome.
1. Confidential Witnesses
Plaintiffs in subprime securities suits have relied to a great extent on the
testimony of confidential witnesses. Of the thirty-four decisions surveyed,
all but three utilized confidential witnesses to support the plaintiff’s scienter
allegations. 183 The only suit that did not use confidential witnesses and
survived motion practice was In re Moody’s Corporation Securities
Litigation. 184 There the plaintiffs had the luxury of relying upon transcripts
from congressional hearings that included internal documents indicating
that Moody’s executives were aware of problems in the independence of
their ratings. 185 In fact, in dismissing the complaint in Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce, 186 the district court specifically noted the absence of
confidential sources. 187
With thirty-one of thirty-four decisions involving confidential witnesses,
it is clear that they play a crucial role in subprime securities suits. With
10b-5 claims in twelve of these cases nevertheless dismissed, it is also clear
that confidential witness statements do not ensure that a complaint will
survive. Where the confidential witness statements failed to show what the
defendants knew or how the confidential witnesses knew what the
defendants knew, the courts dismissed the fraud claims. For example, in
New York State Teachers’ Retirement Systems v. Fremont General
Corp., 188 the statements of forty-two confidential witnesses concerning
exceptions to underwriting standards were found insufficient to allege
759–62 (W.D. Tenn. 2010); Local 295/Local 851 IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust & Welfare
Fund v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d 689, 704 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
182. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007). For a
discussion of Tellabs, see supra notes 128–37 and accompanying text.
183. The three that did not mention confidential witnesses in the opinion or complaint
are: In re Regions Morgan Keegan, 743 F. Supp. 2d 744 (dismissing 10b-5 claims but
allowing Section 11 claims to proceed); Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 773 Pension Fund v.
Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting motion to
dismiss); In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying
motion to dismiss).
184. 599 F. Supp. 2d 493.
185. See id. at 504, 515–17.
186. 694 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
187. See id. at 299.
188. 07-cv-5756, 2009 WL 3112574 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009).
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scienter, because “the allegations do not establish that any of the
confidential witnesses were in a position to gain personal knowledge of
what Defendants saw, knew, or thought.” 189 Similarly, the In re Wachovia
Equity Securities Litigation 190 court rejected evidence from confidential
witnesses where there was “no allegation that any [confidential witness]
met the Individual Defendants, reported any concerns, received any
instructions, or made any personal contact with them during the Class
Period.” 191
Where plaintiffs describe confidential witnesses’ positions in the
company with particularity, however, their statements detailing knowledge
of facts inconsistent with the company’s public statements may show
scienter. The success of the plaintiffs in Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp,
Inc. 192 on their second complaint is one example—where initially the court
rejected the confidential witness statements because of a lack of “specific
information as to the confidential witnesses’ positions in the Company,
their employment duties, the foundation or basis for their knowledge,”193
the court later concluded that the amended complaint fixed these
deficiencies. 194 In re PMI Group, Inc. Securities Litigation 195 provides a
similar example: initially, the court found inadequate a confidential witness
statement that he prepared reports describing non-performing assets that
PMI continued to insure, because the complaint did not describe the reports
in detail, and also rejected a statement that PMI’s exposure to bad loans was
“widely recognized,” because the complaint did not explain how the
witness would know what was “widely recognized” at the company. 196 The
court later held that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged scienter in their
amended complaint, where the confidential witness statements described
the reports with more specificity, and new confidential witness statements
specifically described the defendants’ awareness of these reports.197
The reliance of plaintiffs on confidential witness statements comes in the
midst of some uncertainty over what weight the statements of confidential
sources should be afforded after Tellabs. Subsequent to Tellabs, the
Seventh Circuit held that allegations from confidential witnesses must be
discounted, because “[i]t is hard to see how information from anonymous
sources could be deemed ‘compelling’ or how we could take account of
189. Id. at *11.
190. 753 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
191. Id. at 352.
192. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
193. Id. at 1284. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 179.
194. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-Civ, 2009 WL 3261941, at *1
(S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009) (“In contrast, the Amended Complaint contains sufficient
information regarding these confidential witnesses, including their employment duties,
whether they were employed during the Class Period and how they obtained direct
knowledge of the facts they were reporting.”). The plaintiffs later won a jury verdict in their
favor at trial. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
195. No. C08-1405, 2009 WL 1916934 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2009) (PMI I).
196. See id. at *8–9. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 179.
197. In re PMI Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C08-1405, 2009 WL 3681669, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 2, 2009).
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plausible opposing inferences. Perhaps these confidential sources have
axes to grind. Perhaps they are lying. Perhaps they don’t even exist.” 198
The Fifth Circuit has agreed, 199 while the Third 200 and the Eleventh 201
Circuits have issued opinions holding that anonymity itself does not
undermine confidential witness statements so long as the basis of the
source’s knowledge is described with particularity. In the opinions
surveyed by this Note, two district courts in the Southern District of New
York 202 and one in the District of New Mexico 203 expressly noted this
disagreement; absent guidance from their respective circuits to the contrary,
each weighed whether sufficient detail was provided about the confidential
source’s basis of knowledge. The other opinions surveyed did not directly
consider this burgeoning “split” in the circuits.
2. Position-Based Inferences
In twenty-seven of the thirty-four decisions examined in this Note—
fifteen denials 204 and twelve grants 205 of motions to dismiss—plaintiffs
198. Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007).
199. See Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527,
535 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Following Tellabs, courts must discount allegations from confidential
sources. Such sources afford no basis for drawing the plausible competing inferences
required by Tellabs.”) (citations omitted).
200. See Inst. Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 263 (3d Cir. 2009).
201. See Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008).
202. See In re MBIA, Inc. Sec. Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 566, 590 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241, 267 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
203. See In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 n.11
(D.N.M. 2010).
204. Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery and Food Emp.’s Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp.,
CV: 10-2847, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60761, at *27–30 (N.D. Ala. June 7, 2011); In re
Citigroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 236–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Am. Int’l
Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511, 533–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Freudenberg v.
E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re MBIA, 700 F. Supp. 2d
at 588; Ambac, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 268–69; Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 689 F. Supp. 2d
629, 637–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Thornburg, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1210–11; In re PMI Grp.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C08-1405, 2009 WL 3681669, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009); In re
Wash. Mut., Inc., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1209–20 (W.D.
Wash. 2009); Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-Civ, 2009 WL
3261941, at *1–3 (S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009); In re RAIT Fin. Trust Sec. Litig., 07-CV-03148,
2008 WL 5378164, at *12–13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2008); In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d
1206, 1229–31 (C.D. Cal. 2008); In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d
1132, 1189–96 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Atlas v. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co., 556
F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1156–57 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
205. In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 352–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 744, 757–
58 (W.D. Tenn. 2010); Local 295/Local 851 IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust & Welfare Fund
v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d 689, 725–27 (S.D. Ohio 2010); In re Radian Sec.
Litig., No. 07-3375, 2010 WL 1767195, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2010); In re Sec. Capital
Assurance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 569, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 773 Pension Fund v. Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d
287, 299–300 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Huntington Bancshares, Inc. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp.
2d 951, 970–71 (S.D. Ohio 2009); N.Y. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Fremont Gen. Corp.,
07-cv-5756, 2009 WL 3112574, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009); In re Downey Sec.
Litig., No. CV 08-3261, 2009 WL 2767670, at *9–11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009); Pittleman
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sought to support their scienter allegations by attempting to attribute
knowledge to senior officers at least in part by their positions in the
corporation. Construed broadly, “position-based inferences” might include
a plaintiff’s attempts to attribute knowledge of, or recklessness to, false and
misleading misstatements by pointing to the defendant’s high rank,
membership on committees, receipt of internal reports, or allegations of
widespread internal knowledge at the corporation of which the defendants
could not possibly be unaware.
One should not, however, simply look at the above tally of wins and
losses and conclude that position-based inferences are a path to success for
plaintiffs in surviving a motion to dismiss. On the contrary, those courts
concluding that a plaintiff’s scienter allegations rested solely on the high
rank of the defendants did not hesitate to dismiss the complaint. 206
Similarly, mere attendance at meetings, even where adverse financial
results were discussed, is insufficient. 207 Instead, the cases reveal that
plaintiffs generally do not allege a strong inference of scienter by merely
alleging that defendants had access to information because of their high
rank; a more particularized showing of what information the defendants
possessed is required. As one district court observed in dismissing the 10b5 claims against Fifth Third Bancorp, “[t]here are no factual allegations,
however, that Defendants actually read or reviewed information
available . . . . Since the complaint relies entirely on Defendants’ mere
access to financial data, these allegations fail to support a strong inference
of scienter.” 208
A good example of this requirement can be found in Hubbard v.
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. 209 Initially, the court granted the motion to
dismiss, finding that allegations that defendants regularly received reports
on exceptions to underwriting guidelines did not indicate “what these
Defendants knew or should have known about the Company’s lending
practices . . . because there is no information about what the Exception
Reports actually contained during that time.” 210 The fact that the
defendants sat on a major loan committee “may demonstrate negligence as
to their monitoring of the Company’s lending practices,” but did not rise to
the showing of recklessness required to demonstrate scienter.211
v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., No. SACV 07-0970, 2009 WL 648983, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 9, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Sharenow v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App’x 714
(9th Cir. 2010); In re 2007 Novastar Fin., Inc. Sec. Litig., 07-0139-CV, 2008 WL 2354367,
at *4 (W.D. Mo. June 4, 2008), aff’d, 579 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2009); Tripp v. Indymac Fin.,
Inc., No. CV 07-1635, 2007 WL 4591930, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2007).
206. See Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 725–27; In re Sec. Capital Assurance,
729 F. Supp. 2d at 595; Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 299; In re
Huntington Bancshares, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 971; Fremont Gen. Corp., 2009 WL 3112574, at
*14; In re Radian Sec. Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 594, 616 (E.D. Pa. 2009); In re Downey Sec.
Litig., No. CV 08-3261, 2009 WL 736802, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009).
207. See, e.g., In re Novastar, 07-0139-CV, 2008 WL 2354367, at *4.
208. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
209. 625 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (BankAtlantic I).
210. Id.; see supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
211. BankAtlantic I, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
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The plaintiff’s amended complaint, however, survived the defendant’s
renewed motion to dismiss. 212 Where previously the plaintiff relied upon
the defendants’ high rank to infer their knowledge of risky loans, the
amended complaint used confidential witnesses to put forth particularized
allegations of the duties and responsibilities of the defendants at the
company. 213 For example, instead of alleging that the Chief Financial
Officer “must have known” of the company’s inadequate loan loss reserves,
the amended complaint alleged that the CFO was “responsible for
determining, reviewing and monitoring loan loss reserves.” 214 The
amended complaint also contained particularized facts about the
information contained in the exception reports, and specifically described
meetings attended by the defendants at which these reports were circulated
as agenda items. 215
As with the use of confidential witnesses, 216 resolution of the plaintiffs’
arguments centering on the defendants’ positions at the company at the
district court level touches upon an issue of some disagreement between the
circuits. An alternative route for pleading scienter is the “core operations
inference.” In a nutshell, the “core operations inference” means “that
knowledge of core activities of a business may be imputed to its highest
officials in some circumstances.” 217 The Third, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits have expressed willingness to consider the core operations
inference. 218 Other circuits have not directly considered arguments related
to a company’s core business, but decisions from the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits declining to impute knowledge to management based on the
magnitude or nature of the alleged fraud indicate that these circuits might be
reluctant to accept it.219
212. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. (BankAtlantic II), No. 07-61542-Civ, 2009
WL 3261941, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009).
213. See id. at *3; see also supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
214. Id. at *3 n.6.
215. See id. at *1–2 & n.4.
216. See supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
217. In re RAIT Fin. Trust Sec. Litig., No. 2:07-CV-03148, 2008 WL 5378164, at *12
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2008) (emphasis omitted); see also Bruce D. Angiolillo, Establishing
Scienter in Securities Fraud Actions Through Imputation of Knowledge, in 42ND ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 325, 329 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course
Handbook Ser., No. 24008, 2010), available at Westlaw, 1850 PLI/Corp 325; Gregory A.
Markel & Martin L. Seidel, ‘Core Operations’ Doctrine May Undermine PSLRA, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr.
29,
2010,
available at
http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/article/042910
MarkelSeidelNYLJ.pdf.
218. See Inst. Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 269 (3d Cir. 2009)
(considering the core operations inference as part of the totality of circumstances indicative
of scienter); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that scienter may be inferred from an officer’s position alone when the falsity of the
information is “patently obvious—where the facts [are] prominent enough that it would be
absurd to suggest that top management was unaware of them”) (internal quotations omitted);
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2008) (imputing
knowledge of the lack of demand for the company’s two most important products to its top
senior management).
219. See Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 929 (8th Cir. 2008) (declining to rule whether
the core operations inference is viable, but rejecting plaintiffs’ scienter allegations for failing
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Nine of the district court decisions surveyed by this Note explicitly
discussed the “core operations inference,” with five denying 220 and four
granting 221 the motions to dismiss. Unsurprisingly, all but three of these
decisions have come from the Third or Ninth Circuits, which have
expressly endorsed the core operations inference subsequent to Tellabs.
The decisions suggest, however, a reluctance to find scienter based solely
on the core operations inference. Indeed, in PMI I, the original complaint
was dismissed when it attempted to rely on the core operations inference; it
was only upon repleading, with further factual allegations from confidential
witnesses, that plaintiffs were able to survive the 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. 222 Similarly, in Pittleman v. Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc.,223
the court held that the plaintiff’s factual allegations were insufficient to give
rise to the “exceedingly rare” circumstance that would permit an inference
of scienter solely from the fact that the alleged misstatements involved the
defendant’s core business. 224 In two other dismissals, In re Huntington
Bancshares, Inc. Securities Litigation 225 and In re Radian Securities
Litigation, 226 the courts both held that the plaintiffs’ factual allegations
were insufficient, and that the business activities in question were not
actually “core operations” of the defendants.227
Moreover, even in In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Securities
Litigation, 228 the decision that relied most heavily on the core operations
inference to deny dismissal, the court emphasized that “position alone
to allege sufficient facts indicating knowledge at the company); Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension
Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp. Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 535–36, 539–40 (5th Cir. 2008)
(reversing district court’s denial of motion to dismiss and declining to impute knowledge to
management based on “massive” size of accounting irregularities and defendants’ “handson” management style).
220. Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
PMI I, No. C08-1405, 2009 WL 1916934, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2009); In re RAIT, 07CV-03148, 2008 WL 5378164, at *12; In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1227–29
(C.D. Cal. 2008); In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1189–90
(C.D. Cal. 2008).
221. In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
In re Huntington Bancshares, Inc. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 2d 951, 970, 975–76 (S.D. Ohio
2009); In re Radian Sec. Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 594, 616 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Pittleman v.
Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., No. SACV 07-0970, 2009 WL 648983, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
9, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Sharenow v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App’x 714 (9th
Cir. 2010).
222. See PMI I, 2009 WL 1916934, at *9–10; In re PMI Grp., Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C081405, 2009 WL 3681669, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009).
223. 2009 WL 648983.
224. Id. at *3.
225. 674 F. Supp. 2d 951.
226. 612 F. Supp. 2d 594.
227. Id. at 617–18 (holding that the complaint only established “that Radian’s financial
services segment as a whole [as opposed to the subsidiary whose operations were at issue]
constituted 28% of Radian’s net income in 2006, and 11% of its equity”) (emphasis
omitted); Huntington Bancshares, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (noting that the operations at issue
accounted for “just 3.9 percent of Huntington’s total loans and leases and just 2.8 percent of
Huntington’s total assets, hardly bringing it into the territory of Huntington’s core
operations”).
228. 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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creates a strong inference of scienter only in the extraordinary case where it
is ‘absurd to suggest’ that a defendant did not know.” 229 The scienter
allegations in that case were supported with confidential witnesses, who
described underwriting problems at Countrywide of such breadth that if
“the highly particularized allegations about Countrywide’s core business
operations give even a rough sketch” of Countrywide’s business practices,
many of the defendants’ statements about those practices may well have
been fraudulent. 230 Similarly, though the In re RAIT Financial Trust
Securities Litigation 231 court found that the alleged misstatements about
RAIT’s underwriting standards had to do with the company’s core business
operations, it was also influenced by corroborating testimony of
confidential witnesses indicating that the defendants had ample reason to
know of the falsity of their statements.232
Two decisions included in this survey from the Southern District of New
York are of particular note, as the Second Circuit has not endorsed the core
operations inference subsequent to the passage of the PSLRA in 1995. 233
The In re Wachovia Equity Securities Litigation 234 court noted that the
seminal core operations decision from the Second Circuit predated the
PSLRA by six years. 235 After examining recent decisions in the district and
concluding that those courts varied on the issue, the court “venture[d] to
suggest that the future of the doctrine may be tenuous” and held that it
would consider “‘core operations’ allegations to constitute supplementary
but not independently sufficient means to plead scienter.”236 Meanwhile,
the court in Freudenberg v. E*Trade Financial Corp. 237 accepted the core
operations inference.238 Citing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Makor and
two pre-Tellabs decisions from the Southern District of New York, the
E*Trade court found that the magnitude of E*Trade’s mortgage business
(and subsequent write-offs thereof) relative to its overall business
operations made the inference of scienter compelling for misstatements
about its underwriting practices.239 The scienter allegations in E*Trade
were buttressed, however, by sixteen confidential witnesses pointing to
specific meetings and reports, serious accounting violations, and indications
of insider trading. 240 Thus the E*Trade decision may be unusual only
insofar as it explicitly applied the core operations label; for example, in
another Southern District of New York case surveyed for this Note, In re
MBIA, Inc. Securities Litigation, 241 the district court cited as evidence of
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1192.
07-cv-03148, 2008 WL 5378164 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2008).
Id. at *13–14.
See supra Part I.B.3.
753 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 352–53 (citing Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Id.
712 F. Supp. 2d 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 199.
Id.
See id. at 196–201.
700 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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scienter the importance of MBIA’s credit rating to its business, and the
importance of residential MBS (RMBS) to maintaining that credit rating. 242
III. A FINANCIAL CRISIS DEFENSE?
This part examines the ways in which the financial crisis itself has played
a role in the dispositions of motions to dismiss. First, it discusses the role
the crisis has played in pleading scienter. Second, this part discusses the
effect of the crisis on pleading loss causation.
A. Scienter
In Tellabs, the Supreme Court held that a court should weigh the
inference of fraud against alternative “cogent and compelling” explanations
when determining whether a complaint adequately alleges scienter.243 A
court may also consider matters amenable to judicial notice.244 It is
therefore not surprising that many defendants have sought to attribute
shareholder losses to the financial crisis, accusing plaintiffs of pleading
fraud by hindsight. 245 At the same time, plaintiffs have attempted to use
the crisis offensively, alleging that the defendant’s knowledge of the
growing crisis rendered their public statements fraudulent. Indeed, in
affirming the dismissal of claims against Impac Mortgage Holdings, the
Ninth Circuit noted that both parties agreed that the court should take
judicial notice of the financial crisis, but for opposite purposes.246
1. Grants of Motions to Dismiss
In Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 773 Pension Fund v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce, 247 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
misled investors about their exposure to the growing subprime mortgage
crisis. 248 Both parties attempted to use the financial crisis to aid them in the
motion to dismiss: plaintiffs argued that the defendants “knew or should
have known of the deteriorating market situation.”249 The defendants,
meanwhile, referenced twenty-one exhibits, internet sources, and news
articles about the financial crisis in their motion to dismiss.250 Although

242. Id. at 593 & n.19 (citing In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473–75, 479
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying core operations inference)).
243. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323–24 (2007);
supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text.
244. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322.
245. See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.
246. See Sharenow v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App’x 714, 716 n.1 (9th Cir.
2010). The court declined to resolve the issue of whether it should take judicial notice of the
financial crisis or its causes, as it held that plaintiffs had not adequately alleged scienter
regardless of the economic downturn. Id.
247. 694 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
248. See id. at 292.
249. See id. at 296.
250. See id. at 297 n.2; Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint at 1–4, Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 773
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the court declined to consider the defendants’ exhibits “except to the limited
extent that they inform the competing inference analysis required by
[Tellabs],” it took judicial notice of the financial crisis. 251 The court
rejected the plaintiff’s arguments, holding that even if the defendants had
notice of the crisis, “knowledge of a general economic trend does not
equate to harboring a mental state to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”252
Under the Tellabs comparative inquiry, the inference of fraudulent intent
was less compelling than the inference that the bank chose an incremental
response in the face of “an unprecedented paralysis of the credit market and
a global recession.” 253
Defendants in other cases have had success using the financial crisis as a
defense to scienter. In re Radian Securities Litigation 254 is one example.
There, plaintiffs alleged that defendants downplayed liquidity problems at a
subsidiary that securitized subprime mortgages, misleading investors who
were harmed when the revelation of the truth caused the share price to
fall. 255 To support their scienter allegations, plaintiffs argued, among other
things, that the adverse trends in the subprime industry should have put the
defendants on notice that their statements would mislead investors.256 The
court rejected this argument, stating that the plaintiffs’ allegations
concerning the general state of the subprime industry did not constitute
evidence that the defendants must have known that their actions posed a
risk of misleading investors. 257 The court went further, suggesting that
scienter is more difficult to demonstrate in the wake of the financial crisis.
It cited the Second Circuit’s “marketwide phenomenon” language from
First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp. in stating that “attempts to
hold defendants responsible for market forces out of their control—and
outside of their realm of prediction—cannot succeed.” 258
2. Denials of Motions to Dismiss
Some courts have accepted plaintiffs’ arguments that the knowledge of
the financial crisis itself should be indicative of scienter. One particularly
noteworthy example is the In re Thornburg Mortgage, Inc. Securities
Litigation 259 decision denying dismissal of 10b-5 claims against
Pension Fund v. Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(No. 08 CV 8143), 2009 WL 2043588.
251. See Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 297 n.2.
252. Id. at 300. This language was subsequently cited in In re Sec. Capital Assurance,
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 569, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
253. Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 301; see also In re Wachovia
Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The more compelling
inference . . . is that Defendants simply did not anticipate the full extent of the mortgage
crisis. . . . Although a colossal blunder with grave consequences for many, such a failure is
simply not enough to support a claim for securities fraud.”).
254. 612 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (Radian I).
255. Id. at 606.
256. See id. at 617.
257. Id. at 619.
258. See id. at 620 n.25; see also supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
259. 695 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D.N.M. 2010).
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Thornburg’s President and Chief Operating Officer. 260 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants tried to conceal the company’s financial woes
from investors; the defendants, meanwhile, argued that the losses were
caused by market forces beyond the control or prediction of the company’s
leadership. 261 In rejecting the defendants’ arguments that insider purchases
of Thornburg’s stock by insiders during the class period undermined the
inference of scienter, the court held that a desire to survive the mortgage
meltdown might provide a motive for the defendants to make misleading
statements. 262 This motivation alone was not enough to allege scienter—
also important was confidential witness testimony that the President was so
“deeply involved” in Thornburg’s operations that he knew of Thornburg’s
exposure 263—but the crisis itself was a factor contributing to the “mounting
image of [Thornburg] as a company trying to shield its weakening
infrastructure from the prying eyes of its investors.” 264
Two other cases, In re MoneyGram International, Inc. Securities
Litigation 265 and In re Citigroup, Inc. Securities Litigation, 266 indicate that
courts are more likely to accept allegations that defendants had knowledge
of the brewing financial collapse when they are coupled with allegations of
questionable internal practices. In MoneyGram, the plaintiffs cited external
market indicators—including the decline in the market for MBS and ABSs,
rating agency downgrades, and bankruptcies of subprime lenders—as
evidence that the defendants should have been aware that their statements
about the risks of the company’s subprime portfolio were misleading.267
As in Thornburg, these financial crisis allegations alone were not enough,
but combined with suspicious violations of internal controls by
MoneyGram, particularly in keeping its accounting ledger open throughout
the class period, the court was persuaded that the plaintiff’s narrative of
scienter was at least as compelling as the defendants’ competing narrative
of unforeseeable market collapse. 268 Similarly, in Citigroup, the court was
persuaded by the plaintiff’s allegations that Citigroup took significant
internal steps to mitigate the risks of its CDO portfolio while publicly
proclaiming the portfolio’s soundness. 269

260. Id. at 1225.
261. See id. at 1192.
262. See id. at 1194. The court stated:
The economy in 2007 and early 2008 was a ferocious beast that devoured many
mortgage lending companies. . . . [The Court could infer that] especially during
the mortgage crisis period, the Thornburg Defendants—many of whom were
already holders of a substantial interest in TMI and whose careers were intertwined
with it—sought to infuse TMI with more cash in hopes of increasing public
confidence and giving TMI the capital it needed to ride out the crisis.
Id.
263. Id. at 1211.
264. Id.
265. 626 F. Supp. 2d 947 (D. Minn. 2009).
266. 753 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
267. See Moneygram, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 981–82.
268. See id. at 974, 982–83.
269. See Citigroup, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 237–38.
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Some courts have also rejected efforts to use the financial crisis
defensively. In In re Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Securities Litigation,270
the court rejected the defendants’ arguments that “[i]n light of the broader
financial picture . . . the more compelling inference is that Ambac’s officers
could not predict the economic collapse and consequently the company’s
modeling tools failed to value accurately the risk of loss underlying its
CDO portfolio.” 271 While the defendants presented one inference that
could be drawn from the facts alleged, the court also considered the
plaintiff’s narrative, which portrayed a “vast gap” between the way Ambac
publicly portrayed itself as a company that had retained its conservative
underwriting standards, and its undisclosed lowering of those standards.272
The court went so far as to state that Ambac’s arguments were “premised
on a convenient confusion of cause and effect. The conduct that plaintiffs
allege, if true, would make Ambac an active participant in the collapse of
their own business, and of the financial markets in general, rather than
merely a passive victim.” 273 This language was subsequently cited in
rejecting similar arguments for dismissal in the suit brought against Bear
Stearns. 274
B. Loss Causation
Scienter has been the major hurdle for plaintiffs in financial crisis-related
suits under section 10b and Rule 10b-5: in the cases examined, only one
court that found the plaintiff’s scienter allegations sufficient ultimately
dismissed the complaint for failure to plead loss causation.275 This dearth
of dispositions on loss causation grounds is not for a lack of effort on the
part of defendants. Defendants in sixteen of the decisions surveyed cited
the “marketwide phenomenon” language 276 from Gelt and Lentell in their
motion to challenge plaintiffs’ loss causation allegations in light of the
financial crisis. 277 In ten decisions, these arguments were rejected and the
270. 693 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
271. Id. at 269.
272. See id.
273. Id. at 270. Similar language can be found in other decisions denying motions to
dismiss. See, e.g., Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 192 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (“The ‘current financial crisis’ is not necessarily an absolute defense if it is alleged
that defendants have misled the public as to the quality of their holdings.”).
274. See In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d 423,
504–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
275. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text for discussion of this passage.
277. See In re Bear Stearns, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 506–08; Radian I, 612 F. Supp. 2d 594,
619 n.25 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 24, Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery and Food Emp.’s
Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60761 (N.D. Ala. June 7, 2011)
(CV: 10-2847), 2011 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 2167; Consolidated Memorandum of
Law in Support of the Wachovia Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaints at 81–82, In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F.
Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Nos. 08 Civ. 6171, 09 Civ. 6351), 2010 WL 4020397;
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated
Amended Complaint at 67, In re Citigroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y.
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motion to dismiss denied. 278 In four decisions, the 10b-5 claims were
dismissed on scienter grounds and the court did not reach the question of
loss causation. 279 The argument was only adopted by the district court in
two cases, In re Security Capital Assurance, Ltd. Securities Litigation280
and In re Homebanc Securities Litigation. 281 In Homebanc, the court also
found the shortcomings of the plaintiff’s scienter arguments to be an
independent ground for dismissal. 282 Thus Security Capital Assurance is
the only case surveyed by this Note in which loss causation was the
dispositive issue.

2010) (No. 07 Civ. 9901), 2009 WL 773441; Memorandum of Law in Support of Fannie
Mae’s Motion to Dismiss Claims Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 41, In re
Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (08 Civ. 7831), 2009 WL
5251511; Defendant American International Group, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support
of Its Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 72, In re Am. Int’l
Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (08 Civ. 4772), 2009 WL
2446763; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Class Action Complaint
with Memorandum in Support at 87, Local 295/Local 851 IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust &
Welfare Fund v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d 689 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (No. 1:08-CV421), 2009 WL 2869446; Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss at 39, Freudenberg, 712 F. Supp. 2d 171 (No. 07 Civ. 8538), 2009 WL 1635591;
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion by Defendants Patrick S. Flood & Kevin D.
Race to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 31, In re HomeBanc
Corp. Sec. Litig., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No. 1:08-CV-1461), 2009 WL
5109723, aff’d sub nom. Kadel v. Flood, No. 10–12220, 2011 WL 2015379 (11th Cir. May
24, 2011); Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 43, In re MBIA, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-CV-264), 2009 WL 1635641; XL
Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint at 19, In re Sec. Capital Assurance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d
569 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07 Civ. 11086), 2010 WL 4898813; Memorandum in Support of
Ambac & Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class
Action Complaint at 31, Ambac, 693 F. Supp. 2d 241 (No. 08 Civ. 411), 2008 WL 5372693;
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated
Amended Complaint at 20, In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (No. 07 CV. 8375), 2008 WL 5372580; Countrywide Defendants’ Notice of Motion &
Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint for Violation of the
Federal Securities Laws at 53 n.25, In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d
1132 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. CV-07-05295), 2008 WL 2725371; Defendants’ Suggestions in
Support of Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 37, In re 2007
Novastar Fin., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 2354367 (W.D. Mo. June 4, 2008) (07-0139-CV),
2007 WL 4688210.
278. See Regions Fin. Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60761, at *31–34; In re Bear
Stearns, 763 F. Supp 2d at 506–08; Citigroup, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 236; Am. Int’l Grp., 741
F. Supp. 2d at 534; Fannie Mae, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 414; E*trade, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 202;
MBIA, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 596 & n.22; Ambac, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 273–74; Moody’s, 599
F. Supp. 2d at 513–14; Countrywide, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
279. In re Wachovia, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 367; Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d at
717; Radian I, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 608; Novastar, 2008 WL 2354367, at *4.
280. 729 F. Supp. 2d 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
281. In re Sec. Capital Assurance, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 599; HomeBanc, 706 F. Supp. 2d at
1360–61.
282. HomeBanc, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
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1. Grants of Motions to Dismiss
Security Capital Assurance, Ltd. (SCA) was a financial guaranty insurer,
a company that promises to pay the holder of a security in the event that an
issuer defaults. The plaintiffs, led by the Employees’ Retirement System of
the State of Rhode Island, alleged that SCA made false and misleading
statements about its ABS and CDO exposure as well as about its monitoring
of this exposure, which caused the plaintiffs to suffer loss when the truth
was revealed. 283
The claims that survived the court’s scienter inquiry were dismissed for
failure to plead loss causation adequately. 284 The plaintiffs did not allege
that a single announcement of previously undisclosed information caused a
sharp drop in SCA’s share price; rather, they alleged a “slow, steady
decline” in the value of SCA’s stock resulting from the “gradual revelation
of the truth” of SCA’s exposure to the subprime crisis. 285
The district court traced SCA’s stock price throughout the class
period. 286 At the outset, the court noted that “though Plaintiffs are not
expected to conduct an event study on a Motion to Dismiss, event study
methodology is instructive here” and that the plaintiffs’ wide event window
“made it difficult to isolate the impact of Defendants’ alleged
misrepresentations” from other market events.287
Throughout its discussion of the stock price during the class period, the
court noted the plaintiffs’ failure to address and exclude possible
intervening causes of drops in share prices or to explain rises in the stock
price at certain points.288 For example, the court noted that in November
2007 the rating agency Fitch announced downgrades of a large number of
CDO tranches, including the three insured by SCA, and that the plaintiffs
had not alleged facts suggesting that the decline in SCA’s stock value was
caused by the defendants’ misrepresentations, rather than Fitch’s
downgrades. 289 The court held that the plaintiffs had not “effectively
shown that it was the incremental revelation of Defendants’ fraudulent
misrepresentations, and not the actions of third parties or other
circumstances of the market, that caused the decline in SCA’s share price
283. See id. at 574–78.
284. See id. at 602.
285. See id. at 599.
286. See In re Sec. Capital Assurance, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 599–602. The court began by
quoting the marketwide phenomenon language from Lentell. See supra notes 120–26 and
accompanying text.
287. See id. at 600 & n.5. An event study is a statistical technique that attempts to
separate the effects of firm-specific information and information that is likely to affect stock
prices market-wide. The first step is to select an event window, the period when the firmspecific information becomes available to the market and may affect the price. The longer
the event window, the more likely it includes all new information about the event, but longer
event windows also make it difficult to isolate the impact of the event from other
information that might affect the stock price. See Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, The
Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 49 BUS. LAW. 545, 556–58 (1994).
288. See In re Sec. Capital Assurance, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 600–01.
289. See id. at 601.
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over the Class Period.” 290 Indeed, the district court found that the events of
the financial crisis so overwhelmed the Plaintiff’s loss causation allegations
that in granting leave to replead, it stated that it was unlikely that the
plaintiffs would be able to attribute their losses to specific
misrepresentations by individuals at SCA, only one of hundreds of
companies brought down by RMBS and CDOs. 291
The court in HomeBanc did not engage in nearly so searching an
analysis. There, the court noted that the plaintiffs did not allege that the
information allegedly concealed from investors was revealed, subsequently
causing a stock drop. 292 The plaintiffs’ speculation that the drop in
HomeBanc’s stock “must have been caused by fraudulent conduct” was
unpersuasive in light of the stock’s steady decline throughout the class
period, similar to the declines of HomeBanc’s competitors. 293 While the
court noted that causation issues are usually not resolved at the motion to
dismiss stage, the plaintiffs had failed to make any allegation allowing the
court to distinguish losses caused by the defendants’ misrepresentation and
the general market downturn. 294
2. Denials of Motions to Dismiss
Perhaps the most striking thing about the decisions that rejected the
defendants’ arguments that the financial crisis was an intervening cause is
the brevity of the analysis employed in many of them. In Citigroup, for
example, the loss causation analysis occupied just four sentences of the
forty-five page decision.295 This is perhaps less surprising in those cases,
like Citigroup, where the plaintiff was able to identify corrective
disclosures closely correlated with drops in share price. 296

290. Id. at 602.
291. See id. at 603.
292. In re HomeBanc Corp. Sec. Litig., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
293. Id.
294. Id. (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2005)).
295. See In re Citigroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The
court stated:
Further, [plaintiffs] have adequately pled loss causation. Plaintiffs have identified
several corrective disclosures that allegedly demonstrated the falsity of defendants’
previous statements, and plaintiffs have also alleged that the value of their
securities declined following the corrective disclosures. Plaintiffs’ allegations are
sufficient at this early stage of the litigation. Whether the alleged omissions and
false statements actually caused plaintiffs’ losses cannot be determined at this
stage of the litigation.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
296. See id.; see also Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery and Food Emp.’s Welfare Fund v.
Regions Fin. Corp., CV: 10-2847, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60761, at *31–33 (N.D. Ala. June
7, 2011); In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d 423, 508
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511, 534
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241, 273–74
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 512–13 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
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Yet even in cases where the plaintiff alleged a series of partial
disclosures 297 or a materialization of the concealed risk, 298 the defendants’
arguments often proved unpersuasive, and the court reserved the question of
intervening causation for a later stage in the litigation. 299 For example, in
Countrywide, defendants argued that the complaint did not sufficiently
identify corrective disclosures, or distinguish the effect of the alleged
misrepresentations from the decline in the market in general and among
mortgage lenders in particular. 300 The defendants noted that share prices of
Countrywide’s competitors also dropped precipitously during the same
period. 301 The court was not swayed by the fact that the alleged corrective
disclosures were piecemeal, holding that “loss causation is not precluded by
a series of disclosures; serial disclosures just make it more difficult for
plaintiffs as a practical matter.” 302 The court noted that “the price of
Countrywide securities dropped as the disclosures accumulated,” with many
drops in share price tightly correlated with the disclosures.303
The court also addressed Countrywide’s macroeconomic arguments. 304
The court noted that the financial collapse would raise complicated issues
on damages, but held that it would be the fact-finders’ job to apportion the
losses proximately caused by Countrywide’s misrepresentations. 305 In fact,
the court noted, the complaint indicated that “Countrywide’s deteriorating
lending standards were causally linked to at least some of the
macroeconomic shifts of [the financial crisis].” 306 Thus, far from holding
that the intervening cause of the economic downturn rendered the plaintiff’s
loss causations allegations insufficient, the court suggested that
Countrywide was at least partially responsible for the downturn itself.

297. See Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 202–03 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); In re MBIA, Inc. Sec. Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 566, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re
Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1200–01 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
298. See In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 382, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
299. See, e.g., id. (noting that “[a]lthough it may be likely that a significant portion, if not
all, of Plaintiffs’ losses were actually the result of the housing market downturn and not
these alleged misstatements, at this stage of pleading” plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient);
Am. Int’l Grp., 741 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (holding that “[a]lthough Defendants may ultimately
demonstrate that some or all of Plaintiffs’ losses are attributable to forces other than AIG and
the Section 10(b) Defendants’ material misstatements and omissions,” the existence of
intervening events is a matter for proof at trial (citing Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v.
Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003))). For a discussion of Emergent and
Lentell, see supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
300. See Countrywide Defendants’ Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss the
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws
at 50–55, In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(No. CV-07-05295), 2008 WL 2725371.
301. See id. at 53.
302. Countrywide, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
303. Id. at 1201.
304. Id. at 1173–74 (“For the past year, almost all Defendants have recited—at hearings
and in their papers—that an ‘unprecedented’ external ‘liquidity crisis’ caused . . .
Countrywide’s decline.”).
305. See id. at 1174.
306. Id.
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There is, however, one outlier in the cases reviewed by this Note. In In
re Moody’s Corporation Securities Litigation, 307 the district court also
rejected the defendant’s financial crisis defense to loss causation, but its
analysis was far different than that of other courts. 308 Moody’s, a ratings
agency, and its officers were alleged to have made misstatements and
omissions regarding its business, independence, the method and meaning of
its credit ratings, and the manner in which it had generated financial results
and growth. 309 Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the financial
collapse was the “direct intervening cause” of the drop in Moody’s share
prices, and therefore of the plaintiffs’ losses. 310 The defendants relied on
Gelt to argue that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged facts to show that
the loss was caused by the misrepresentations, and not the intervening
events. 311
The district court denied the motion to dismiss and held that loss
causation was adequately pled.312 Significantly, however, the court did not
rest its decision on the basis of the plaintiff pleading facts that demonstrated
their losses were caused by the misrepresentation instead of the financial
collapse. 313 Instead, the court began by citing Lentell for the proposition
that the question of an intervening event is reserved for trial. 314 Further
relying on Lentell, the court stated that “[w]here there is a market-wide
downturn in a particular industry,” a plaintiff must show that their loss was
caused by the fraud. 315 The court thus framed its task as determining
whether there was a market-wide downturn in the credit ratings industry at
the time of the drop in stock price. 316 The court compared the stock prices
of Moody’s to those of its biggest competitor, the rating agency Standard &
Poors, and found that S&P’s stock rose during the class period. 317 The
court thus held that it could not conclude that there was a market-wide
downturn in the credit ratings industry, and reserved the question of the
effect of intervening events on loss causation for trial.318
IV. LESSONS FROM SUBPRIME SECURITIES LITIGATION
This part attempts to draw some conclusions about subprime securities
litigation from the foregoing analysis of this sampling of cases. First, this
part provides conclusions about the factors influencing the resolution of

307. 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
308. See id. at 512–15.
309. See id. at 499–501.
310. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the
Consolidated Amended Complaint at 19, In re Moody’s, 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (No. 07-CV-8375), 2008 WL 5372580.
311. Id. at 20.
312. See Moody’s, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
313. See id. at 513–14.
314. See id. at 513.
315. Id.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 513–14.

310

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

subprime securities cases discussed in Part II. Next, this part offers
conclusions about the effect of the financial crisis on the cases reviewed.
A. Dispositions
In Part II, this Note examined the cases and determined that adequately
pleading scienter has been the key factor in determining whether or not a
subprime securities suit would survive dismissal. 319 The plaintiffs in the
subprime securities suits surveyed relied to an extraordinary degree on
confidential witnesses. 320 While not a guarantee of success, when the
confidential witnesses were described with enough particularity to allow the
court to determine their bases of knowledge, the complaint was likely to
survive the motion to dismiss, while failure to do so was likely to result in
dismissal. 321
Similarly, position-based inferences could aid a plaintiff in pleading
scienter, but only insofar as such inferences were supported by
particularized facts pointing to knowledge on the part of the defendants.322
Allegations based solely on a defendant’s high rank were rejected. 323 The
required particularized facts were often themselves provided by confidential
witnesses. 324
Finally, Part II discussed two points of divergence between the Circuit
Courts of Appeals that surfaced in the district court decisions surveyed by
this Note. 325 Yet neither played a particularly important role in determining
the outcome of the cases examined. Those courts that noted the
disagreement on confidential witnesses analyzed the witness statements for
particularity without the disregard espoused by the Seventh Circuit, while
most district courts did not acknowledge this disagreement at all.326 Given
the importance of confidential witnesses to securities plaintiffs, and the
ability that district courts have shown to discern their reliability, courts
should be hesitant to undercut witness utilization. Moreover, the concerns
cited by the Seventh Circuit—that the confidential witnesses may have
“axes to grind” or may not even exist 327—could apply equally to named
witnesses at the motion to dismiss phase, where the court must accept all
the plaintiff’s allegations as true and refrain from deciding disputed issues
of fact. 328 The instruction in Tellabs to consider competing inferences
should not change the basic inquiry on a motion to dismiss.

319. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
320. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
321. See supra notes 183–97 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
323. See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 210–15 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 198–203 (discussing disagreement between the circuits on the use of
confidential witnesses) and notes 217–42 (discussing core operations inference) and
accompanying text.
326. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, while the core operations inference aided plaintiffs in some
cases, it was usually not enough in and of itself to plead scienter without the
support of other particularized facts.329 Even in Countrywide, the court
took pains to emphasize the “extraordinary” nature of that situation. 330 If
the use of the core operations inference spreads to other circuits, as
decisions in the Southern District of New York suggest it may, 331 the
doctrine should remain limited to extraordinary cases lest the scienter
inquiry become too focused on a defendant’s position at the company,
rather than his knowledge of facts belying his public statements.
B. The Financial Crisis and 10b-5 Securities Litigation
One might have expected the unique situation of the financial crisis to
dominate the litigation that followed in its wake. But in this sampling of
cases, the factors examined in Part II of this Note played a more important
role in determining the outcome of subprime securities suits than did the
crisis itself. Still, some lessons can be gleaned that may help guide the way
forward as courts attempt to deal with the flood of litigation stemming from
the collapse.
1. Scienter
In dealing with the aftermath of a financial catastrophe, it is entirely
proper for courts to decline to hold defendants responsible for failing to
predict the unpredictable. This effort to avoid hindsight bias, however,
should not translate into a free pass for defendants to escape otherwise
meritorious claims. Simply put, there is no principled reason why it should
be any easier or more difficult to plead scienter in the wake of a marketwide downturn: properly applied, the inquiry should focus on what facts
were known to the defendants at the time of the alleged misrepresentations.
The In re Radian decision thus contains some questionable reasoning that
courts should avoid. 332 The district court there relied upon the Second
Circuit’s decision in Gelt for its much-cited proposition that “when the
plaintiff’s loss coincides with a marketwide phenomenon causing
comparable losses to other investors, the prospect that the plaintiff’s loss
was caused by the fraud decreases.” 333 Contrary to its usage by the Radian
court, the Gelt decision concerned loss causation, not scienter. This is not
to say that the court necessarily reached the wrong result in granting
dismissal, but its analysis was flawed on this point. Unlike loss causation,
which is directly affected by the company’s stock price, scienter is not
inextricably intertwined with the conditions of the market; thus the analysis

329. See supra notes 217–42 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 255–58 and accompanying text.
333. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 772 (2d Cir. 1994); see
supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
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of whether scienter is adequately pled should remain limited to what the
defendants knew and when they knew it.
On the other hand, the approach in Thornburg should also be avoided.334
The motive cited by the court—survival of the financial collapse—is one
that every defendant in a management position would possess.335 Taken to
an extreme, every defendant in a management position could face liability
following a market downturn. Thus, considering such vague motives as
“survival” to be facts indicative of a strong inference of scienter would
undermine the main goal of the PSLRA: preventing strike suits. 336
In the end, courts attempting to ascertain whether a plaintiff has pleaded
a strong inference of scienter in the wake of financial catastrophe should
walk a middle path. The financial crisis should serve only to provide
context to the plaintiff’s factual allegations, whether as an element of the
plaintiff’s allegations or as a competing inference to be considered under
Tellabs. Where, as in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, those factual
allegations are found to be sparse and conclusory, it is entirely appropriate
to dismiss, as mere knowledge of a general economic trend should not
suffice to allege scienter. 337 This does not mean, however, that such
knowledge may never contribute to a successful pleading of scienter:
where, as in Citigroup and MoneyGram, 338 that knowledge is demonstrated
by particularized facts belying the defendant’s public statements, the claims
should be allowed to proceed.
2. Loss Causation
As for loss causation in the wake of the financial collapse, two
conclusions may be drawn. First, the financial crisis defense against loss
causation simply has not proved persuasive where plaintiffs have
adequately pleaded the other elements of a 10b-5 action.339 Second, it is
clear that circuit courts should provide district courts with more guidance
with respect to how a plaintiff must account for intervening causes when
pleading loss causation. In the sampling of decisions reviewed by this
Note, loss causation has not proved as important as scienter. Nevertheless,
the contrast between the in-depth analysis conducted by the district court in
In re Security Capital Assurance, Ltd., Securities Litigation340 and the
comparatively superficial analysis conducted by other courts indicates a
lack of clarity. 341 This guidance should first come from the Second Circuit,
whose unclear passage in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co. 342 has been widely

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See supra notes 260–64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 265–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 276–83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 283–91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 295–306 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.

2011]

BLAME THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

313

cited by defendants and district courts around the country as they attempt to
resolve the effect of the financial crisis on pleading loss causation.343
Whatever form this guidance may take, it should not follow the reasoning
of In re Moody’s. 344 The analysis adopted by the district court in that case
is questionable in a number of respects. First, the methodology adopted—
comparing the stock price of the defendant to that of the defendant’s
competitors to determine if there was a downturn in a particular industry—
finds little support in Lentell. 345 The relevant language in Lentell states that
an “an intervening event, like a general fall in the price of internet
stocks . . . is a matter of proof at trial and not to be decided on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,” while a “marketwide phenomenon causing
similar losses to other investors” decreases the chances the plaintiff’s losses
were caused by the fraud. 346 The Moody’s court, however, held that a
downturn in a particular industry would require plaintiffs to rule out
intervening events in order to survive a motion to dismiss.347 While Lentell
is certainly unclear, it is difficult to see how a downturn in a particular
industry can constitute a marketwide phenomenon. 348
Moreover, even if the language can be stretched to support such a
reading, applying this comparative methodology would be bad policy.
Fraud may be committed by one company in an industry that happens to
suffer a downturn, or by every company in that industry—indeed, one
might argue that this aptly describes the demise of the subprime lending
industry. 349 Under the analysis adopted by the Moody’s court, the plaintiffs
in Countrywide may not have been able to survive the motion to dismiss
despite well-pleaded allegations of large-scale fraud; all other mortgage
lenders were also hit hard by the crisis. 350 Additionally, defining what
constitutes a “particular industry” is difficult; this is evident in Moody’s
itself, where the court compared Moody’s stock price with just one
competitor. 351
In weighing the effect an intervening cause has on loss causation, district
courts should remember that the question on a motion to dismiss is whether
the defendant’s misdeeds caused a loss, not how much of a loss the
defendant may have caused. 352 While the Supreme Court in Dura required
that a plaintiff distinguish the loss caused by the misrepresentation from the
“tangle of other factors” affecting the price, it also noted that pleading loss
causation should not prove a great burden on plaintiffs.353 Thus, while
343. See supra notes 277–82 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 308–18 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
346. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch, 396 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2005); see supra notes 120–26
and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the role of fraud in subprime
defaults).
350. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
352. See supra Part I.B.4.a.i.
353. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
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dismissal may be appropriate in cases like HomeBanc where plaintiffs
utterly failed to provide the court with facts allowing the court to apportion
the loss caused by the defendants’ misstatements, 354 plaintiffs should not
have to hire expert witnesses to conduct complicated analyses at the motion
to dismiss phase.
CONCLUSION
Motions to dismiss are only the first chapter in securities litigation arising
out of the financial collapse, a chapter not yet fully written. The cases
surveyed in this Note highlight the legal issues that will influence the
resolution of 10b-5 claims for subprime securities losses as investors
continue to seek recompense for the harm they suffered in the subprime
mortgage meltdown and ensuing credit crisis. Indeed, as Circuit Courts of
Appeals begin to weigh in, the issues arising out of subprime securities suits
may ultimately shape the contours of the private 10b-5 action as it
continues to evolve from its origins in the Great Depression.

354. See supra notes 292–94 and accompanying text.
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